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Improving Memory and Mood Through 
Automatic and Controlled Procedures of 
Mind 
Paula T. Hertel 
Memory procedures and emotional states function together. Affective tone 
permeates episodes of memory functioning. Memory functions centrally in 
episodes of emotional disturbance, serving to feed the episode with fuel from 
past events or to repress those events when one hopes to escape or avoid the 
episode. When cognitive procedures are impaired by emotional states such as 
depression and anxiety, people do not perform the tasks and achieve the goals 
that could help to repair their moods. In the context of these considerations, 
then, we must view the improvement of memory as not merely a possible 
outcome of change in emotional states, but as a factor in effecting such 
change. Memory improvement and mood improvement function together. 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between memory functions and 
the negatively valenced emotional states of anxiety and depression. lsen 
(1984), Bower (1981), and others have discussed the relation of positively 
valenced states to memory, showing that a positive mood improves intentional 
memory for positive and sometimes neutral events. However, in a very 
practical sense, knowing that one can sometimes remember better in a good 
mood is trivial to the goal of memory improvement; the problem becomes one 
of trying to attain the good mood. Also, people in elated states don't care very 
much about possible memory difficulties that arise from extreme arousal or 
from attempts to recall negative events. In contrast, people care a great deal 
about impaired functions associated with depression and anxiety (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Poon, 1980). Furthermore, our knowledge of angry 
memory is limited, and it would seem to be a transitory phenomenon unless 
anger is accompanied by depression. These are the reasons for restricting my 
topic to depressive and anxiety-related phenomena in memory. The central 
goals in improving the memory functions of depressed and anxious people are 
restoration to nonna/ levels and eventual mood repair. 
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This chapter is organized according to the considerations noted at the outset. 
The first section briefly reviews the major findings in the literature on memory 
impairment associated with depression and anxiety. The emphasis is placed on 
findings that offer interesting implications for memory improvement. The 
second section pertains to memory improvement during mood impairment. 
Improving one's memory provides a reduction in the number of things one 
must feel depressed or anxious about. It also helps to achieve more important 
goals that might eventually assist in mood repair. The third section talces up 
the bidirectional relation of memory functioning and disturbed mood. In this 
section, I review the literature on cognitive biases associated with depression 
and anxiety, with an eye toward their alleviation. The third section is based on 
the assumptions that the best way to improve memory functioning is to repair 
the disturbed mood and that such repair involves important adjustments in 
memory procedures. 
The literatures on mood-related effects in memory are guided by various 
theoretical perspectives (e.g., schema theory, network theory). Following the 
lead of others (e.g., Clark & lsen, 1982; Eysenck, 1982; Hasher & Zacks, 
1979), I appeal to the theoretical distinction between automatic and controlled 
processes in order to establish a framework for this review. In the manner 
outlined by Kahneman (1973), I refer to procedures that can occur without 
attention or conscious awareness as automatic processes. Controlled processes 
are those that require attention or the use of resources that are essentially 
limited by a relatively fixed capacity for conscious thought. An emphasis on 
specific cognitive procedures holds the greatest promise for research on 
memory improvement (see Herrmann & Searleman, 1990). 
Memory Impairment in Depressed and Anxious States 
Many reviews of mood and memory emphasize research on the association of 
mood with the emotional meaning of the materials or events to be 
remembered (i.e., mood congruence; e.g., Blaney, 1986; Ingram, 1984; Isen, 
1984; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). I briefly address issues related to mood 
congruence below, where I take up the interrelation between mood and 
memory improvement. Here I review research on memory impairment when 
depressed or anxious subjects encounter relatively neutral information. 
Relatively neutral materials probably constitute a large portion of what one 
encounters in occupational or educational settings. 
Although symptoms of depression and anxiety correlate highly in some 
populations, there are potentially important differences in their effects on 
memory functions (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987). 
Unfortunately, few researchers have taken measures of both types of affect, 
so the similarities and differences in the findings on depression and anxiety 
should be viewed with caution (see Greenberg & Beck, 1989). Furthermore, 
the findings I review are gathered from different types of depressive 
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populations (experimental inductions, dysphoric college students, outpatients 
with depressive symptoms and syndromes, and hospitalized depressives with 
and without other nosologies) and different types of anxious populations 
(students with test, state, or trait anxiety; phobics; and patients and students 
with other anxiety-related disorders). In my discussions of depressive and 
anxiety-related phenomena, I ignore possible differences associated with the 
type of population unless those differences have contributed to a reliable 
taxonomy of corresponding effects on memory functioning. For the most part, 
this has not been the case (cf., Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
Depressive Deficits 
A number of reviews of depressive deficits in memory conclude that 
depression is associated with a reduction in effortful or controlled processing 
within a limited capacity system (e.g., Ellis, & Ashbrook, 1988; Williams et al., 
1988). According to this view, depression depletes the resources needed to 
perform more difficult processing tasks. Depletion occurs through 
physiological limitations on processing capacity or through the allocation of 
attention to irrelevant features of self or context (Beck, 1967; Ellis & 
Ashbrook, 1988). Depressed subjects in memory experiments, then, 
presumably have limited ability to employ controlled processes such as 
organization and elaboration--processes that require attention within the 
limited capacity system (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979) and benefit subsequent 
attempts to remember. 
Within this general framework of depressive deficits in controlled processing, 
some research has emphasized the organization (or the structure) of the 
materials to be remembered. Williams et al. (1988) and Ellis and Ashbrook 
(1988) have suggested that well structured or organized materials make fewer 
processing demands. Recall of clearly structured prose passages like those 
used by Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, and Doren (1985) does not refle.ct 
depressive deficits, whereas recall of more obtuse text does (see Watts & 
Cooper, 1989). As early as 1976, Russell and Beekhuis showed that the ability 
to sort nouns into obvious categories during the learning task was not 
impaired by psychotic depression. Depressed patients in studies by 
Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, and Gerdt (1981) showed recall 
deficits with unstructured word lists but not when the lists were clearly 
categorized. So in the sense of inherent structure of materials to be 
remembered, depressive deficits occur with poorly structured materials. 
Accounts of depressive deficits that emphasize depletions in resources tend to 
maintain that depressed subjects lack the resources to detect or to impose the 
structure that will benefit later recall. 
Other specifications of impaired processing point to deficits in elaborative 
processing. Roy-Byrne, Weingartner, Bierer, Thompson, and Post (1986) 
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found depressive deficits in recalling elaborated materials from a semantic 
orienting task but no deficit in frequency judgments, which are often not 
affected by elaborative processing. 
Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez (1984, Experiment 1) showed that college 
students who were experimentally induced to feel depressed did not recall 
words that were each studied in elaborated sentences as well as did neutral 
subjects; perhaps they failed to expend the resources needed to fully process 
the elaborated contexts or to use them at the time of recall (see Ellis, 
Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985). In another experiment that employed 
induction procedures, Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) showed a depressive 
deficit in recall of words placed in contextually difficult (less obvious) 
sentences but not in recall of words from sentences that were highly related 
to the words. Hertel and Rude (1991b) failed to replicate these findings with 
naturally depressed college students. (Also see Hasher et al., 1985; Ingram, 
1989; Isen, 1984; for discussions of possible differences in memory effects 
associated with naturally occurring versus experimentally induced depression.) 
Recently, however, we have replicated the findings of Ellis et al. (1984, 
Experiment 3) with clinically depressed outpatients. The results of this 
experiment suggest modifications to previous speculations about the nature of 
depressive deficits in controlled processing. 
In the incidental learning phase of an experiment by Hertel and Rude 
(1991a), outpatients exhibiting symptoms of unipolar depression, recovered 
outpatients, and nonpsychiatric controls judged the semantic fit of words into 
easy or difficult sentence frames. One learning condition was similar to the 
procedure of Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3): The word and the frame were 
displayed concomitantly, and subjects judged the fit whenever they chose to 
do so during the duration of the trial. Another condition restricted the display 
of the word to 1 second at the beginning of the trial; subjects were required 
to repeat the word and make the judgment at the end of the trial. In this 
second condition, then, the subjects' attention was focused on the task, in that 
they were required to rehearse the words and possibly encouraged to process 
them more elaboratively in the context of the sentence, whereas in the 
unfocused condition, subjects' attention was less constrained to focus on the 
task. The unfocused condition produced a depressive deficit in the subsequent 
free recall of words from the difficult contexts. In contrast, depressed subjects 
in the focused learning condition recalled those words as well as did both 
control groups. 
Clearly, these results suggest that depression does not limit the ability to 
allocate sufficient resources to a more difficult task. Yet an emphasis on 
controlled processes is still quite appropriate: When the task was unfocused, 
depressed subjects might have paid less attention to the materials; perhaps 
they allocated attention to task irrelevant processing. However, under focused 
learning conditions that were at least as demanding, depressed subjects 
performed as capably as nondepressed subjects. Hertel and Hardin (1990) 
describe deficits of the type that was demonstrated in the unfocused condition 
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as depressive deficits in initiative. Unlike subjects in a neutral mood, 
depressed subjects fail to spontaneously initiate controlled processes that 
would benefit intentional remembering. When procedures are guided by 
instructions or when tests of memory bypass the advantage of uninstructed 
procedures employed spontaneously by nondepressed subjects, initiative ceases 
to be the issue and depressed subjects do not show memory impairments. 
Deficits in initiative might be understood as difficulties in detecting the 
optimal strategy. Experiments by Leight and EJtis {1981), conducted with 
experimental inductions of depressive and neutral moods, have shown 
depressive impairments in the discovery of higher order structure for letter 
strings. In the varied-input condition, the learning task encouraged but did not 
instruct for the discovery of higher order meaning. In the constant-input 
condition, such discovery was made more difficult. Following the learning 
phase, subjects were transferred to a similar task with new letter strings, under 
either varied or constant conditions. The important result for the present 
purposes was that nondepressed subjects who received varied input on the 
learning task detected the higher order meaning and transferred that strategy 
to the second task, regardless of their mood or the conditions of input during 
the second task. A depressed mood prevented the detection of the optimal 
strategy, but once it had been discovered under neutral conditions, depressed 
subjects used the strategy effectively. 
Depressive deficits in initiative might also be understood as motivational 
disturbances. Experimentally depressed subjects tend to report less curiosity 
and are less motivated to read about psychology experiments (Rodrigue, 
Olson, & Markley, 1987). Riskind (1989) suggested that reduced interest in 
external events might even cause a reduction in the allocation of resources to 
cognitive tasks. Along these lines, Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, and 
Murphy (1982) obtained a high correlation between sustained motor effort 
and recall at longer delays in a short-term memory task (for depressed 
subjects only). Because these tasks share few elements, the authors suggested 
that they are related through a central motivational state. Such a central 
mechanism could also determine the tendency to initiate strategies beyond the 
requirements of the task. 
Retarded initiation of voluntary action is emphasized by Coyne and Gotlib's 
(1983) review of depression research. Similarly, Rehm (1982) related loss of 
initiative to deficits in self-monitoring and self-control. Retarded initiative, 
however, does not imply that depressed subjects simply suffer from low levels 
of arousal or lack incentives. Several investigators provide evidence that 
depressed people are ultimately very cooperative (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), that 
simple manipulations of incentive do not affect depressed subjects more than 
others (Richards & Ruff, 1989), and that CNS arousal characterizes 
depression (e.g., Kuhl & Helle, 1986). Clearly, the relation between depression 
and specific motivational constructs has not been well delineated. 
Kuhl and Helle (1986) have developed an interesting approach to 
understanding the cooccurrence of central arousal and behavioral passivity in 
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depression. They proposed that chronic depression is maintained by 
unfulfillable (degenerated) intentions. Intentions to achieve essentially 
unattainable goals use resources needed to enact new intentions. Thus, to the 
extent that they are "on one's mind," they induce arousal while ensuring 
passivity in ongoing tasks. One test of this account established a very minor 
unfulfillable goal (cleaning up a messy table) that, for depressed subjects only, 
seemed to remain active during subsequent tests of prospective memory 
(remembering to number pages) and memory span for words. Kuhl and 
Helle's work is compatible with the notion that ruminations occupy the 
cognitive capacity needed for ongoing tasks, but the ruminations are not 
necessarily self-related, and they interfere with the initiation of new tasks as 
well as with routine processing demands. 
Finally, Watts, MacLeod, and Morris (1988b) suggest that the depressive 
mind is not always actively engaged in task irrelevant thoughts when deficits 
are observed in memory tasks. Mind wandering seems to occur during prose 
processing or retrieval, but when depressed subjects are engaged in planning 
during problem solving (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi) the mind "goes blank." 
Going blank seems to reflect difficulties in thinking about what to do next. 
Anxiety-Related Deficits 
In reviewing research on anxiety-related deficits in memory functions, Eysenck 
(1982) and Wine (1980) offered interpretations that emphasized attentional 
capacity. As in the hypothesis with depressive deficits, capacity is presumably 
occupied by extra-task processing. Unlike accounts of depressive deficits, 
however, Eysenck proposed that anxious subjects attempt to compensate with 
increased effort; they do better at easy tasks, while still showing the deficit in 
difficult tasks. Thus, anxiety reduces the reserve of resources for controlled 
processing, with arousal mediating the effects related to task difficulty. 
Moreover, arousal seems to have consequences for cue utilization 
(Easterbrook, 1959). Task irrelevant cues are eliminated by moderate levels 
of arousal, but higher levels seem also to eliminate more central, relevant cues 
(see Geen," 1980, for a review of cue utilization in test anxiety). 
A particularly good summary of evidence of anxiety-related deficits in 
memory is provided by Williams et al. (1988, Ch. 3). Such deficits involve 
impaired elaboration, referred to by Williams et al. as biases toward surface 
level processing. Anxiety also seems to reduce the use of organizational 
processes, but such reduction sometimes is compensated for by other means. 
For example, Mueller (1976) has shown evidence of less clustering by anxious 
students without an overall deficit in free recall. 
In general, anxiety-related deficits occur under conditions that are widely 
similar to those in which depressive deficits arise. Impaired elaborative and 
organizational processes are associated with susceptibility to sources of 
distraction that use resources within a limited capacity system. Ingram and 
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Kendall (1987) suggested that anxious subjects' task irrelevant focus is less 
self-oriented than what seems to be the case with depressives, but when the 
overlap between depression and anxiety is eliminated, so is the evidence for 
differences in self-focus (Ingram, 1990). Some anxious subjects, however, do 
show signs of excessive preoccupation with stressful situations and misperceive 
their demands (Ingram et al., 1987). They sometimes compensate by 
increasing their efforts on aspects of the task that are under their control 
(easier tasks that benefit from high levels of arousal). 
rmally, it might be important to consider that almost all demonstrations of 
mood-related impairments have used tests of intentional remembering (see 
Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). As has been found by Hertel and Hardin (1990), with 
depressed college students, mood impairments may not occur on tests where 
remembering is not the focus of attention but, instead, may occur in the 
course of performing other tasks. (Mood congruency, however, has been 
demonstrated in such tasks; these effects are described below.) Moreover, 
unintentional uses of memory clearly outdistance intentional uses of memory 
in their frequency and importance of occurrence. The irony of this observation 
lies in the realization that mood-impaired people are not aware that 
unintentional uses of memory may be unimpaired. They notice failures to 
remember when they are trying to remember. An important step in future 
research on memory impairment and complaints should be taken in the 
direction of exploring unintentional uses of memory by depressed and anxious 
people. 
Memory Improvement During Mood Impairment 
In their multimodal approach to suggestions for memory improvement, 
Herrmann and Searleman (1990) made distinctions between "content" 
manipulations, such as standard mnemonic techniques, and "process" 
manipulations, such as changes in emotional states. According to their view, 
process manipulations in the realm of depressive and anxiety-related deficits 
are somewhat synonymous with mood improvement (addressed in the next 
major section of this chapter). Evidence of mood dependent memory, also 
taken up briefly by Herrmann and Searleman, is mixed in the realm of 
depression and anxiety. Some researchers see mood dependent memory as a 
special case of mood congruency (e.g., Blaney, 1986); others doubt its 
existence or stress that it occurs only when other contextual cues are weak 
(e.g., Bower & Mayer, 1989). Even if mood dependent memory turns out 
eventually to be a reliable phenomenon, we might wonder what it offers in the 
way· of memory improvement techniques, beyond instructions to make one's 
mood during study comparable to one's mood during testing, or vice versa. In 
this section, then, I restrict my review to research on memory improvement 
in the realm of content and strategy manipulations used with depressed and 
anxious subjects. The aim is to find ways of improving memory performance 
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to be used by people experiencing ongoing impaired moods. 
The major question that arises in considering memory improvement 
techniques for depressed and anxious people is whether such improvement 
indeed is possible without mood repair. For example, after reviewing the 
evidence for depressive deficits in cognitive capacity, Williams et al. (1988, 
Chapter 3) wondered if depressed subjects are able to process "deeply;" some 
clinical studies have shown that depressives benefitted less than normals from 
inherent structure (i.e., the approximation of word lists to text). The 
implication is that depressed and anxious people should be resigned to 
function on low capacity as best they can. However, research that has focused 
on structuring not the materials but the task itself, through instructions and 
design, holds more promise for believing that people with impaired moods can 
engage the procedures that lead to good performance on memory tests. The 
advice that emerges from this research, described next, is to understand 
componentially the requirements of tasks to be completed by mood-impaired 
people, to construct methods for engaging the necessary procedures, and 
above all, not to abandon them to the weaknesses of their own initiative or to 
their irrelevant thoughts. 
Specific Procedures for Memory Improvement 
Because disturbances in the focus of attention characterize both types of mood 
impairments, it makes sense that there have been several successful attempts 
to improve memory by mobilizing the attention of depressed and anxious 
subjects for task appropriate processing. The evidence described above 
regarding the elimination of depressive deficits in recall by requiring attention 
to the target words during incidental learning (Hertel & Rude, 1991a) is one 
example of such an attempt. Instructions to image during initial exposure to 
materials is yet another way. If subjects cooperate, imagery improves memory 
by way of both elaborative and organizational procedures. According to Watts, 
MacLeod, and Morris (1988a), imagery instructions improved severely 
depressed subjects' memory for prose, even though they still reported losses 
of concentration. Edmunson and Nelson (1976) showed that imagery 
instructions helped highly anxious students (as well as nonanxious students). 
In general, reviews of attempts to improve the performance of test anxious 
students on memory tasks (e.g., Geen, 1980) emphasize the importance of 
directing attention to task relevant features and away from sources of 
distraction. 
Directing attention away from sources of distraction experienced by 
depressed people can be achieved by increasing task demands. Krames and 
MacDonald (1985) obtained this result in a dual-processing task with varying 
degrees of cognitive load. Nondepressed subjects recalled more words from 
the beginning of lists under low loads than under high loads, but the reverse 
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was true for the depressed outpatients, who showed a "distraction effect" 
under low loads and recalled at higher levels as load increased. Ruminations 
apparently can be overridden by attention-demanding tasks. 
Attention-demanding tasks, of course, do not necessarily mobilize attention 
in ways that benefit memory performance. Many tasks are susceptible to the 
use of special strategies that are not specified by instructions. Hertel and 
Hardin (1990), for example, emphasized the importance of guiding depressed 
subjects in their use of controlled strategies for recognition. In these 
experiments, experimentally depressed, naturally depressed, and nondepressed 
college students completed two different tests of memory fo� homophones 
whose less frequent meanings (e.g., pear instead of pair) had been biased in 
an incidental study phase. In the first test of memory (spelling), the number 
of homophones spelled in line with the studied bias indexed the unintentional 
use of memory and did not show a depressive deficit. Tests of unintentional 
uses of memory typically do not show effects of elaborative learning or invite 
strategic procedures during testing, and so nondepressed subjects should not 
show the advantage of initiating unrequired ·procedures. Tests of intentional 
remembering, such as recognition, are susceptible to uninstructed procedures, 
and on the following test of recognizing homophones from the study phase, 
depressive deficits were revealed. Specifically, nondepressed subjects tended 
to use strategies for recognition that employed the intervening spelling test, 
whereas recognition and spelling were stochastically independent for depressed 
subjects. Most important for research on memory improvement were the 
results from attempts to provide all subjects with strategies that might have 
been employed spontaneously by nondepressed subjects. When they were 
directed to recall the study phase as they spelled (Experiment 2) or to use 
their performance on the spelling test as a bridge to the study phase during 
recognition (Experiment 3), the recognition performance of depressed subjects 
improved. 
The investigation of impairments in strategic processing has been the focus 
of research on problem solving in depression. Silberman, Weingartner, and 
Post (1983) found that depressed subjects focused less on a single hypothesis 
than did nondepressed subjects and solved fewer problems. Yet, when they 
were required .to list their hypotheses while solving, depressed subjects 
improved. Similarly, Abramson, Alloy, and Rosoff (1981) discovered that when 
depressed subjects were provided with hypotheses for problem solving, they 
performed as well as normals. 
In summary, we might conclude that depressed people can be helped to 
perform well on tests of intentional remembering if they are required to 
attend to task relevant features and guided to employ appropriate strategies. 
Although anxious people probably do not suffer from the lack of initiative, 
they nevertheless need help in focusing on the relevant features of the task. 
One might surmise from the comments of Ingram and Kendall (1987) and 
Wine (1980) that anxious people would also profit from specifications of 
strategies for unstructured situations. Yet, what can be done more generally 
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in memory-training programs to encourage depressed and anxious people to 
develop skills for use beyond the task at hand? 
Memory Training 
According to Williams el al. (1988, Ch. 3), there have been few, if any, 
demonstrations of long-term instructional effects for depression and anxiety. 
Poon (1980) outlined a multifaceted program that includes specific suggestions 
for practicing learning strategies and for developing retrieval plans. Yet, as 
Watts et al. (1988a) aptly comment, "the main challenge is likely to be getting 
[depressed people] to actually use the strategies" (p. 187). No one (depressed, 
anxious, or "normal" people alike) likes to use the effortful, controlled 
procedures that typify memory improvement techniques. Indeed, . Poon's program includes many motivational components to encoura�e practice. 
Long-term improvement in the real world also depends heavily on what one 
might call "prospective metamemory." Practiced and skilled we may be, but we 
still must consciously remember to use the techniques, at least until they 
become automatic or habitual. Prospective metamemory might be best 
achieved if training and practice take place in a variety of settings and tasks 
so that cues to use the procedures are linked to the situations in which they 
are needed. 
Finally, it seems likely that a stable of mnemonic and search techniques 
might not be the thing to emphasize in training programs with depressed and 
anxious people. What seems to be particularly necessary is practice at staying 
on task, perhaps assisted by external aids. Training in breaking down the 
components of cognitive tasks might help to override depressive deficits in 
initiative and planning. In this regard, main-line research on memory might 
do well to emphasize specific procedures of mind (Kolers & Roediger, 1984). 
Functional approaches, such as the description of relations among classes of 
cues (Watkins, 1990), offer direct application to memory training. 
Any program designed to improve memory functions in the long run must 
also consider factors beyond training in specific skills and strategies (Poon, 
1980). For example, a reduced sense of self-efficacy in cognitive tasks is 
associated with depressed moods (Bower, 1983) and test anxiety (Wine, 1980). 
Self-efficacy determines what one attempts to do and how well one persists in 
doing it (Bandura, 1977). Therefore, training in self-efficacy--through 
experience in structured tasks--might help to improve performance on 
unstructured memory tasks (also see Hertzog, this volume). In addition, Kuhl 
and Helle (1986) advised that we teach depressed people strategies for 
disregarding intentions unrelated to the task at hand. 
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Improvement in Mood and Memory 
Improvement in memory functioning of mood-impaired people seems best 
achieved by repairing the disturbed moods. Does mood repair actually help? 
Our assumption that it does relies on evidence that mood-impaired subjects 
do not perform as well as others. Most of these studies are correlational; even 
in the ones that employ experimental inductions, some other phenomenon 
associated with the induced mood may actually cause the deficit (see Riskind, 
1989). What is needed is research in which mood-impaired subjects are 
randomly assigned to treatments for mood repair or to wait lists, with a 
demonstration of pretreatment deficits and posttreatment recovery. 
If mood repair does improve memory performance, the method of treatment 
seems to be critical. For example, remediation of memory difficulties 
associated with test anxiety has not been achieved reliably by treating the 
emotional component of anxiety through relaxation techniques (see Williams 
et al., 1988, Ch. 3; Wine, 1980). Furthermore, one cannot repair mood 
disturbances without involving memory functions. The success of attempts at 
mood repair is clearly affected by ongoing memory procedures such as mood 
congruent attention and retrieval. 
Selective attention to mood congruent aspects of current experience and 
selective remembering of mood congruent aspects of events from the past 
constitute ubiquitous findings in the literature on mood and memory (see 
reviews by Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; lsen, 1984; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). 
However, the selectivity of these procedures is commonly thought to be an 
automatic aspect of feeling state, with controlled processes operating on the 
material that is automatically selected for attention (Clark & Isen, 1982; but 
see the superb critique by Blaney, 1986). Mood is presumably maintained by 
automatic selection and repaired by controlled processes. Sometimes 
controlled processes such as active rehearsal of mood-related materials are 
thought to operate in such a way as to reconcile their meaning and achieve 
self-control (e.g., Rehm, 1982); sometimes controlled processes direct 
attention away from further processing and toward more neutral material. 
Next, I describe a few examples of mood congruent effects that illustrate these 
proposed phenomena. 
In the realm of automatic selection, several studies (reviewed by Williams 
et al., 1988, Ch. 10) have shown selective attention to threat-related words by 
anxious subjects. Also, Eysenck, MacLeod, and Mathews (1987), for example, 
showed that trait anxious subjects spelled homophones in the direction of 
threat-related meaning (e.g., die vs. dye). Similar effects have been found in 
depression; for example, a depressed mood has been associated with lowered 
thresholds for detecting failure-related words (Postman & Brown, 1952) and 
emotional words in general (Small & Robins, 1988). Yet, according to 
Williams et al., depressive effects in automatic selection have not been 
demonstrated when anxiety is controlled. 
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Automatic retrieval processes, to the extent to which they characterize 
procedures in tests of unintentional memory, also are implicated in anxiety. 
Subjects in a study by Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck (1989) were asked 
to imagine scenes for threatening and nonthreatening words and to judge their 
pleasantness. Later they were provided with three-letter stems for old and new 
words and told to complete them with the first word that came to mind. 
Subjects with generalized anxiety disorders completed the stems of old 
threatening words more often than other types and more often than did 
controls. In the controlled-processing test of cued recall, however, 
anxiety-related differences were not obtained. Furthermore, others cited by 
Mathews et al. have found that anxious subjects actually recall fewer 
threatening than nonthreatening words. Perhaps controlled processes operate 
to avoid further processing of threatening materials. 
Illustrations of mood congruent effects on intentional recall abound. 
Symmetries with respect to depression and anxiety are most often found when 
materials have been processed self-referentially (e.g., Greenberg & Beck, 
1989; Ingram et al., 1987). Such symmetries led Ingram and Kendall (1987) 
to suggest that anxious and depressed subjects engage similar procedures, with 
the products of the procedures exhibiting differences associated with the type 
of mood. Others might point out that controlled procedures operate to 
different ends, as a consequence of motivational factors such as avoidance (in 
anxiety) or mood repair (in depression). We can reasonably assume that 
controlled procedures would be involved in attempts at mood control. Such 
attempts would not always be important in typical experimental contexts (and 
therefore symmetries between depression and anxiety can be demonstrated), 
but they would more likely arise in natural contexts for retrieving personal 
memories (see Costanzo & Hasher, 1989). 
A framework for reconciling the sometimes disparate findings on mood 
congruency has been offered by Williams et al. (1988, Chapter 10). Their 
model holds that depression and anxiety involve different types of biases in 
specific procedures that are either passive (automatic) or awareness based 
(controlled). Anxiety operates like automatic priming in moving resources 
toward threatening materials. Later, awareness-based procedures direct 
resources away from threatening materials, thereby inhibiting the development 
of cues for recall. In contrast, depression biases the products of controlled 
processes by deploying resources to the recruitment of depression-related 
information. The model provides links to certain notions of adaptation: 
Anxiety helps people to avoid danger, so automatic aspects of information 
processing are sensitive to anxiety; one function of depression is to come to 
terms with loss, so controlled procedures are sensitive to depression. 
Based on their model, Williams et al. (1988) provide some suggestions for 
remediation of impaired mood. Treatments that emphasize positive aspects of 
experience can, through rehearsal, make them more likely to be automatically 
selected. Furthermore, treatment may help mood-impaired people to become 
aware of the ways that automatic processes contribute to their mood states. 
Improving Memory and Mood 55 
Such awareness might not directly modify the state, but it could provide 
opportunities for the counterconditioning of emotional processes. For 
example, if threatening stimuli are not avoided, reactions other than fear can 
be conditioned and erroneous ideas about threat can be challenged (see Foa 
& Kozak, 1986). A similar point is made by Beck et al. (1979): By 
concentrating attention on "automatic" negatively valenced thoughts, depressed 
people could then redirect resources to more productive focal points and 
those procedures might become more automatic with practice. 
More generally, cognitive therapies have been shown to be effective in the 
treatment of depression (e.g., Teasdale, Fennell, Hibbert, & Amies, 1984) and 
the "worry" component of anxiety (Wine, 1980). Cognitive therapies include 
techniques of cognitive restructuring of depressive or worrisome thoughts. 
Teasdale (1983) tells us that cognitive therapy helps the client to gain access 
to more realistic thoughts; such access can be attained through the guidance 
of thoughts or the improvement of mood, which provides automatic access to 
positive thoughts. The processes involved in restructuring might well involve 
redirecting resources to more productive thoughts in both conscious and 
unconscious ways (Williams et al., 1988, Chapter 10). 
Conclusions 
In reviewing what we have learned to date about memory improvement, 
Herrmann and Searleman (1990) reached three conclusions. First, people will 
not continue to use very effortful techniques. According to some formulations, 
the use of such techniques by depressed and anxious people is inherently 
limited by their moods. Alternatively, my review has led to the conclusion that 
the attention of depressed and anxious people can be mustered for effortful 
processing by structuring the requirements of the task. This capability, 
however, does not obviate the problems associated with long-term 
improvement in intentional remembering. Some remediation might be 
achieved through training in prospective metamemory, which would require 
a clearer understanding of functional aspects of memory. 
Functional analyses emphasize specific aspects of the task under 
consideration. Similarly, Herrmann and Searleman's (1990) second conclusion 
was that memory training should focus on skills that are specific to the 
materials and task at hand. The notion of specificity should also be extended 
to the domain of mood-related impairments, such as difficulties in planning 
and in attending to task-related cues. 
Third, the focus of memory training should be "multimodal." One of the 
modes addressed by Herrmann and Searleman (1990) is the emotional state 
of the rememberer. The authors suggest that various modes operate in ways 
that are both central and peripheral to the memory system. This observation 
clearly holds for depressive and anxious memory. Impaired moods perhaps 
function peripherally to affect motivations associated with planning and task 
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initiation. Impaired moods function centrally to channel the focus of attention, 
sometimes away from the task and sometimes toward mood-related aspects 
of experience. The distribution of resources to mood-related material may 
function to maintain the mood and associated memory problems, but it can 
be used therapeutically to repair the mood by summoning controlled processes 
in situations where automatic processes typically hold sway. 
Gaining control seems to be what memory training is all about. In contrast, 
losing control by practicing to make effortful procedures automatic (Klatzky, 
1984) or by using memory unconsciously (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987) might turn 
out to be better advice to give depressed and anxious people. Because we 
rarely consider the unconscious effects of past experience, memory complaints 
surely are based on failures to intentionally remember. Who knows what 
deleterious effects are exerted by beliefs about impaired memory and the 
concomitant resolution to try harder? Unless the depressed or anxious person 
understands specifically how to improve memory, trying harder to remember 
may merely exacerbate the impairment by providing more salient examples of 
failure that increase anxiety and depression. 
Endnote 1 
The writing of this chapter was supported by Grant # R03 MH44044 from the 
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